Apart from all the others?
Democracy decays
What is so special about democracy as a system? Unless you subscribe literally to the classical idea that vox populi vox dei, there’s nothing mystical about getting the general public to decide who governs Britain.
A system of government needs to justify itself on grounds of efficacy and efficiency. What has democracy offered on that front?
Quite a bit, actually.
The advantages of democracy
The Wisdom of Crowds
First, there’s the concept of the wisdom of crowds. That’s the idea that the collective opinion of the public is more incisive than that of any individual, even experts. Certainly there’s plenty of evidence from other fields, such as investment, that what appears to be individual skill is often in large part luck or temporary advantage only. And there are those who would argue that the British public in aggregate has a long track record of choosing the best option on offer at successive general elections.
This concept is much-discussed. The evidence for it is in reality only moderate. It also rests on the assumption that all participants share enough relevant information.
The Channelling of Power
Then there’s the question of how efficiently decisions are made. Any type of government has its priorities: to govern is to choose. The number of those priorities will vary between governments but real priorities will always be pursued by governments of any type. Russia’s foreign policy is no less effectively pursued because Russia is a dictatorship.
Beyond those priorities, however, it is quite impossible for any government of any type to be in full command of the considerations underlying all decisions required within the system. How best to organise the sewerage system? What train lines to build? Should the state have a policy on how children learn maths and if so what should it be? How to regulate AI? Should a new bypass be built round Bath? Should pension funds invest in local companies?
Most of these decisions will be taken well out of sight of the upper echelons of government or under a single official’s executive authority. The decision-makers will be in office because of their connections with higher levels of government (whether political or social). Within the parameters set from above, they may have their own priorities. This is as true in a democracy as in any other system of government.
For decisions in those categories, power derives from connections with the decision-makers and how the decision-makers can exercise their own power. Decisions can be challenged by those who claim to greater connection with the decision-maker, appealing to a decision-maker’s superiors or when unrelated changes to the connections to the decision-maker take effect.
In any system such processes are governed by laws and by judicial authorities. It is easier in some systems, of course, to change those laws or to influence judicial authorities than in other systems. The basic point is consistent across all systems, however. Power is wielded in most instances well beyond the reach of most members of the public. Changes in how that power is wielded takes place in exactly the same way.
This all takes place in democracies too. HS2 would have been built long ago if that weren’t the case. Because power is more widely distributed in a democracy, such changes tend to be less sudden and less capricious. Democratic governments must be able to justify their original decisions to an electorate and must be able to justify their changes of decisions to that electorate too. While most subjects are not going to be vote-changing, the perception of arbitrariness, corruption or highhandedness usually is.
More subtly, democracies usually have checks and balances on the use of such power. The executive is scrutinised by the legislature. The courts provide effective checks on arbitrary uses of power.
This provides two further advantages. First, the actual decision is more likely to fall within the range of objectively reasonable decisions. And secondly, it is less likely that it will have been secured by means that are damaging. Any kind of corruption has a cost. The higher the cost, the fewer actions become viable. Economically marginal plans become impractical if hidden costs are too great. The fewer people you have to pay off, the more likely you’ll be able to afford to do something.
As a result, democracy has proven to be a fairly efficient way of making government decisions, in some respects at least. Democratic processes may take some time but once they have been exhausted, they command an authority that historically has obtained widespread consent. The lack of alternative power bases in most circumstances means that such decisions in the past have stuck — at least until the public change their minds.
This is not the case in other systems. For example, Cardinal Wolsey had the idea of founding a college in Ipswich to rival Winchester and Eton. The project was quite far advanced but it came to a screeching halt when he fell out of favour with Henry VIII. Only a gateway remains.
At this distance, it’s very hard to tell whether this was a sensible infrastructure project for 1520s England. It seems to have been originally selected so that the Cardinal could give something to his hometown. And it was stopped because the king had no wish to continue that particular benefaction once the primary benefactor was in disgrace. Efficiency was not a consideration for either the Cardinal or the king.
Trust in Government
Democracy helps with efficient government in a different way. Because democratic governments are answerable to the public, the public can have some degree of confidence that the decisions governments take are being made in good faith in the interests of the public. This means that when democratic governments need the compliance of the public or even their engagement, they are much more likely to get it. A good recent example of that emerged during the recent pandemic. Democratic countries saw higher voluntary uptake of vaccinations than non-democratic countries (and countries with long-established democracies saw higher uptakes than countries which became democracies more recently).
And now?
For these advantages of democracy to continue to hold, the conditions in which they exist need to continue also. All over the developed world, they appear to be weakening.
The Scattering of Crowds
The whole concept of the wisdom of crowds rests on there being a single crowd. More and more, however, we are seeing the public splintering into more and more groupuscules. These groups keep themselves apart, they see entirely different sets of opinions, they see entirely different sets of facts. They get their news from different places. They strictly edit what they see news about. These groupuscules barely engage with each other except to throw vitriol at each other. Never mind not agreeing on the answers, they do not agree on the questions. Never mind that, they don’t even agree on the facts. The demos is splintering.
This shouldn’t be overstated. The great majority of normies, in Britain at least, remain connected with each other. Such people, very wisely, would look at you blankly if you mentioned Sue Gray’s name or asked them whether they were gender critical. They would have no views about Nigel Farage’s banking difficulties. They would, however, be able to talk at length about food price inflation and problems in the NHS.
This phenomenon of splintering is one still found mainly among the extremely online. However, the numbers who are extremely online are steadily increasing. The trend is set and if anything accelerating.
There is an inflection point beyond which we cannot sensibly talk of a single crowd with equal access to facts and opinions. Once that point is reached, an average position reached is not the wisdom of a crowd but an average of different wisdoms. It’s hard to see why that should be particularly worth paying special regard to.
Non-democracies have been vigorously encouraging this trend. The Russian troll farms and their less-remarked counterparts in China and elsewhere have a purpose. They have every interest in undermining efficacious decision-making in democracies, taking away a competitive advantage that democracies have over them. We need to fight back.
The Subversion of Safeguards
The advantages that come from having power accountable only endure if the public pay attention to the decision-making processes and respect those who keep those in power accountable. In recent years, however, the public’s interest in good administration has markedly waned. In its place, populist impulses have taken hold. And politicians, rather than accept unwelcome judgments, now feel free to challenge the legitimacy of judicial processes head-on.
In times gone by, a politician being charged with a felony would have been career-ending in the USA, at least at a national level. Now Donald Trump’s supporters fully subscribe to his claim that it is a witch hunt. Similarly, Boris Johnson’s diehard supporters are convinced that the Privileges Committee is a kangaroo court. Neither set of supporters trouble themselves with addressing the underlying accusations against their idol, which in the case of Donald Trump look very substantial and in the case of Boris Johnson were conclusively proven.
Nor is this just a question of hero worship. When the Divisional Court ruled that the government needed Parliamentary approval to trigger Article 50 of the European Union Treaty, starting the legal process for withdrawing from the EU, the Daily Mail branded the judges “ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE” on its front page. Any exercise of institutional power that thwarts the government is currently treated by government supporters as evidence of a deep state woke blob, and by implication illegitimate.
Nor is this confined to the right. Jeremy Corbyn’s acolytes vociferously refuse to accept that their hero might have even big toes of clay. A film called “Oh Jeremy Corbyn — The Big Lie” is doing the rounds.
If political purity tests or personal allegiances are more important than holding politicians to account for their actions, it becomes much easier for politicians to act capriciously or corruptly. If misconduct has no consequences, we can expect some politicians to take full advantage. And they have.
Again, this can be overstated. Abraham Lincoln noted more than 150 years ago that you can fool some of the people all of the time. And while both Donald Trump and Boris Johnson still have fervent supporters, both have large numbers of vehement opponents. In particular, Boris Johnson is now stupendously unpopular with the public as a whole. You still can’t fool all of the people all of the time.
Even so, we are seeing a regression taking place in modern democracies, with tribal allegiances taking precedence for an increasing number of voters over policies and good administration. We can see in African democracies where tribal allegiances weigh heavily on voters’ minds, and it has not led to good governance.
Standards of governance are at present visibly declining before our eyes in Britain. There seems no reason to expect this trend to reverse in the short term.
Increasing distrust in government
We have polling on this. Britain is doing better than many other countries, according to the OECD. The OECD has identified five drivers that can influence trust: integrity, responsiveness, reliability, openness, and fairness. Britain scores relatively well on openness, fairness and reliability, but relatively poorly on responsiveness and integrity. The venality shown by ministers when stepping out of government and onto the gravy train has a malignant impact on public trust.
Still, trust in government has been declining for a generation. Another major advantage of democracy is being eroded.
A battle looms and a call to arms
We need to fight. Not to save democracy, it’s not under any direct threat. No, we need to fight to save the benefits that democracy brings as a system. Those are under strain and not enough is being done to defend them. This is something we all need to play a part in. Are we ready?